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The  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  during  World  War  One  and  the 
emergence of the modern state system in the Middle East have received 
significant attention in academic literature. However, the impacts that 
the proliferation of state borders in the 19th and 20th centuries have 
had on political and economic integration within the Middle East is 
often ignored. This study argues that between the mid-19th and mid-
20th  centuries  the  region  underwent  significant  structural  changes. 
Furthermore, these changes were driven by external intervention and 
internal  decline.  A  number  of  theoretical  assumptions  are  posited 
concerning  the  importance  on  integration  and  cooperation  of  the 
following: the increase in borders and claims to sovereignty and the 
separation of peoples/markets. The conclusions drawn are that the 
change  from  a  system  characterised  by  large  political  actors  and 
integrated markets to one which is characterised by smaller states and 
separated markets led to the disintegration of the region’s internal 
relations.
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Introduction
Studies of the international relations of the Middle East have been dominated by 
discussions of inter-state relations and conflicts.1 The dominant state- and conflict-
centric approaches used to study this region largely ignore the impact of regional 
structures and non-state actors.2 Furthermore, much existing literature tends to view 
the region’s international relations in a relatively short time-frame. This usually entails 
exploring the region’s history since World War One. Again, this is problematic as it 
results in the exclusion of an analysis of the transformation of the regional system since 
the mid-19th century. The main argument of this paper is manifested in two parts. The 
first is that the proliferation of states in the Middle East following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the occupation of much of the region by the British and French 
following World War One led to the disintegration of intra-regional relations.3 That 
is to say that, relations between people in the Middle East were relatively integrated 
under the imperial system in the sense that there were fewer borders and boundaries 
(both physical and imagined) between them.4 This was a result of the lack of state 
borders within the region – these were few in number and left large swathes of 
territory as part of the same political entity and economic market. Introducing modern 
states as a way of organising people into political entities resulted in the creation of 
many political borders and many claims to sovereignty over territories which often 
were relatively small in scope. The second element of this paper’s argument is that 
the post-World War One disintegration of the Middle East system disrupted economic 
as well as political activity within the region, ultimately resulting in more instability in 
intra-regional relations.
Essential to this study is the belief in the value of historical analysis as well as the 
adoption of the tools of historical sociology in the study of international relations.5 
Understanding and explaining the relations of the Middle East requires us to view 
1  Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.
2  F. Gregory Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East Studies”, International Studies Review, Vol 1, No 1, 1999, 
pp. 11-31.
3  See: David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern 
Middle East, London, Phoenix, 2010.
4  William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Oxford, Westview Press, 2000, 
pp.40-44.
5  Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.), Historical Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002. (
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the history of the region not as cyclical or full of patterns of behaviour. There is more 
value in viewing the region’s history as containing multiple layers of progression/
movement from one condition to another – unevenly experienced at different times 
and in different spaces for the inhabitants of the region. It is certainly the position of 
this paper that searching for patterns of behaviour with regards to this region at least 
prevents the development of an eclectic framework of analysis which can take into 
account the diversity of experiences of the people in the region.
In  order  to  develop  an  analysis  of  the  systemic  transformation  which  took  place 
in the Middle East in the 19th and 20th centuries this study addresses three core 
research questions. The first considers what the experiences of people living in the 
Middle East were like under the previous system in terms of level of interaction and 
integration  through  the  movement  of  people,  goods,  capital,  services  and  ideas. 
The second area of investigation focuses on what these experiences have been like 
following the emergence of the modern state system. A final question to address is 
how these changes have affected economic integration, stability and the potential 
for cooperation between people in the region. This latter question draws upon the 
analytical assumptions outlined as part of a theory of systemic transformation and 
integration/interdependence theory which follow in the pages below. It is true that 
these questions are quite ambitious and it is not possible to fully answer them in just 
one study and the use of case study analysis from part of the Middle East is used here 
as an initial analysis. 
Conceptualising the Middle East System
It  can  be  claimed  that  systemic  structures  determine,  to  a  significant  extent, 
international  relations  within  any  given  regional  system:  through  shaping  the 
interests, capabilities and patterns of behaviour of the actors in that system.6 This is 
a bold claim about the relationship between structure and agency and is based on 
existing literature within this debate.7 This paper does not, however, seek to engage 
fully with the structure-agency debate. Nevertheless, for the clarity of this analysis this 
core assumption must be outlined to some extent and so elements of this debate will 
be reflected on at various stages in the following pages. With regards to the Middle 
East, the system under consideration here includes both state and non-state actors. 
Primary in most analyses of the region are the state actors – the governments, military 
forces, intelligence services and other security services – and the international in the 
international relations denotes relations which cross territorial borders between these 
state actors.8 However, a pluralistic approach to studying the international relations of 
the region is required. The modern state as actor in the Middle East is a relatively new 
form of actor and one which has been, for the most part, externally transplanted onto 
the region as opposed to one which has internally evolved and emerged.9 Furthermore, 
6  Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, International Organisation, 
Vol 41, No 3,1987, pp: 335-370
7  Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agency, Structure and International Politics: From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry, 
New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 3. 
8  Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations. 
9  James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 173.(
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historically, non-state actors, including influential individuals and economic actors, 
have been important in shaping relations at the local and regional level.10 
There is a clear distinction between the contemporary system and previous systems 
which existed in the Middle East, with the latter all tending to share key characteristics. 
The contemporary Middle East system is a state-system with a significant number 
of intra-regional borders, boundaries and claims to sovereignty.11 Previous systems, 
including the one which immediately preceded the state-system and which spanned 
from the 15th to early 20th centuries, were characterised by (intra-regional) empire.12 
These systems were characterised by few internal borders, boundaries and claims 
to sovereignty. This observation is important when considering the argument that 
borders, boundaries, claims to sovereignty and multiple ‘ways’ of organising people 
into groups help to determine international relations. Any given region with many 
of these will likely be less stable, internally, than one which contains few,13 or which 
is highly integrated through institutions, for example, the EU. There is a correlation 
between levels of integration between states/markets and the stability of the relations 
between them.14 Greater levels of economic interaction between people in any given 
system tends to lead to greater interdependence between them.15 This economic 
interdependence encourages peaceful coexistence and helps to reduce conflict by 
increasing the profits derived through peaceful interaction while at the same time 
increasing the costs of conflict.16 Power in international and domestic relations is 
primarily economic in nature and therefore competition between actors occurs largely 
in the economic sphere. Where there is a high level of economic interdependence 
and  economic  cooperation,  competition  between  actors  will  be  limited.17  On  the 
other hand, in a disintegrated system where interaction is limited and where levels of 
economic interdependence are low, cooperation between actors (state, or non-state) 
is likely to be hindered.18 
This paper does not discuss inter-regional relations here as it is concerned exclusively 
with  an  analysis  which  considers  intra-regional  relations.  This  is  not  to  suggest 
that  processes  of  globalisation,  interdependence  and  interaction  cease  at  some 
imagined regional boundary. These processes and their existence in a global system 
are acknowledged. Rather, the focus here is on patterns of international relations 
10  Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilisations, London, Penguin, 1993, pp. 72-83.
11  Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2005. 
12  Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, pp. 25-32.
13  Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, Comparative Political Stud-
ies, Vol 29, No 2, 1996, pp: 122-163.
14  Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books, 1984.
15  Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Surrey: Princeton 
University Press, 1984, p: 49.
16  For an authoritative and informative assessment of how economic interdependence renders violent confronta-
tion obsolete see Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advan-
tage, London, Read Books, 1911. 
17  Paul Krugman and Michael Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 5th Edition, Reading, Addison-
Wesley, 2000, p: 3.
18  Aysegul Aydin, “The deterrent effects of economic integration”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol 47, No 5, 2010, pp: 
523-533.(
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within the Middle East and between Middle Eastern actors before and after the state-
system was formed there in order to explore how this change may have affected the 
direction of intra-regional relations. It is true that placing the emphasis on a Middle 
East-centric approach risks simply replacing one dominant perspective (the western-
centric approach found within much International Relations and Middle East Studies 
literature) with another. However, little literature exists on the impacts of the systemic 
transformation which took place in the Middle East prior to and following World War 
One and even fewer studies have been approached with the people of the Middle East 
and their experiences as the focus. 
The key thesis of this analysis is that a systemic transformation occurred in the Middle 
East through the 19th and 20th centuries and reached its apex around one hundred 
years ago. This transformation regarded the region-wide patterns of organising the 
people of the region into groups and rests on the fundamental assumption that how 
people are organised and what groups they are organised into are key determinants of 
the relations which take place between them and others. In other words, any given set 
of people may behave towards each other in one manner at one time, but if they are 
organised differently and their groups are altered they will interact quite differently 
– even if this change takes place over a short period of time. It is essential to this 
analysis that the relations which are discussed are not simply those which are classed 
as international. Instead we must consider the relations as inter-human relations – as 
in not seeing people as belonging simply to one state or another and therefore being 
defined simply as elements of that state, but as people first and foremost. In the case 
of the transformation of the Middle East system this is of great importance due to the 
rapid changes in citizenship which took place during the period of transformation. 
Over a very short period of time individuals in the region changed from being a citizen 
of one state, say the Ottoman Empire, to an entirely different (and almost exclusively 
new) one19, such as Jordan, Syria or Kuwait. When considering relations in this way 
and not simply discussing international relations we can gain a better understanding 
of  how  the  changes  which  took  place  altered  intra-regional  relations.  In  a  literal 
(and state-centric20) translation of the term international relations we would simply 
be discussing the inter-state/inter-empire relations of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Qajar-led Persian Empire, for example, and then the multiple inter-state relations 
which emerged after World War One as new states were created (or imagined). We 
would thus be ignoring the relations between people in the form of non-state actors 
in those empires when they did not interact directly with people or non-state actors 
in the other empire(s). For example, it is useful for us to consider how people from 
Salt (in contemporary Jordan) and those in Nablus (in the West Bank of contemporary 
Palestine) interacted when they were part of the Ottoman Empire and then following 
the systemic transformation which left them in different states and with a new border 
between them. It is to this discussion that this paper now turns. 
At first consideration the political map of the Middle East is familiar and relatively 
constant.  The  states  of  the  region  can  be  identified  easily  and  even  the  most 
19  Kamrava, The Modern Middle East.
20  Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and 
International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. ix.(
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inexperienced  student  of  the  international  relations  of  the  region  can  present  a 
respectable amount of information about at least some of the states of the region. 
But here in lies the problem. The common-sense understanding of the Middle East as 
consisting of the twenty or so states (give or take a couple for sovereign status and/or 
geographical definition21) that we see so neatly presented on political maps symbolises 
a perception of the region which is isolated in time and lacks critical awareness. 
Perhaps even more worryingly it denotes a surrender of the ability to critically explore 
and analyse the region and its international relations. In contrast, a quick exploration 
of a political map of the region from the late 19th century will suggest a far simpler 
understanding of who was there and by extension how many sets of international 
relations there were. The changes to the political map of the Middle East that have 
taken place in the past one hundred and fifty years or so are extremely profound and 
make an understanding of contemporary international relations there dissimilar to 
that of the mid-1800s or early 1900s. 
To be more specific, in the late 19th century there were two major empires in the 
region along with a small number of far less significant emirates or sheikdoms.22 
Flexibly using current definitions for identifying states, therefore, we can identify the 
Ottoman Empire and the Qajar-led Persian Empire as the two principal regional state-
actors at that time. The Moroccan Empire under the Alaouite dynasty in the Maghreb 
(present-day Morocco and parts of Algeria), the Imamate of Oman and the fledgling 
Saudi entity in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula complete the regional system of 
that time (much of the Saharan territories of what are today North African states were 
left out of the Middle East system in general, even by the early 20th century, due to 
extremely low levels of population and because much of this territory simply acted 
as transitory routes for the caravan trade and was uninhabited23). The intra-regional 
international relations of this system were limited, therefore, to a small number of 
state-actors and the borders of these entities, while long in some cases, were quite 
remote from the vast majority of the people of the region. Living in Cairo or Alexandria, 
for example, would have meant living in the heart of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, 
Cairenes or Alexandrians would rarely have to consider their international relations 
with Persians (as foreigners) in a way which meant something to their every day lives. 
One problem arises when we consider the implications of European imperialism in 
the region. By the late 19th century two sizeable areas of the Ottoman Empire had 
been occupied by European powers and so alter our assessment of the number of 
actors in the Middle East system at the time that the transformation of the region 
was reaching its peak. The French occupation of the Ottoman Vilayet (province) of 
Algiers in 1830 and the subsequent annexation to France of that territory in 183424 
can be viewed as injecting a new empire/state into the regional system. This view 
21  The states classed as being in the MENA region according to this study are as follows: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, UAE, and Yemen. 
22  Christopher Catherwood, A Brief History of the Middle East, London, Robinson Publishing, 2010. 
23  James Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire, London, Vintage, 1999.
24  Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Develop-
ment, 1830-1987, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. (
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can be contradicted by the interpretation that the French action in Algiers was a 
single process of invasion and the start of the introduction of the state system into 
Middle East. This argument requires us to view this process as very lengthy and as 
characterised by the almost constant resistance to French domination (both physical 
and imagined, and culminating in the Algerian War of Independence in the 1950s and 
1960s). Likewise, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882,25 which was promoted as 
an endeavour driven by economic interests (the ensuring of the repayment of British 
loans to Egypt26) can be seen in much the same way as the French action in Algiers. The 
provincial boundaries of these territories remained largely the same as they were prior 
to the European invasions, that is, open to the movement of goods and people for the 
most part. As such they do not represent the same processes of political and economic 
disintegration found in the latter stages of the systemic transformation discussed here. 
If we compare the number and closeness to population centres of the state borders 
of  today’s  system  with  the  previous  system  we  find  that  often  borders  and  by 
extension international relations are much closer to most population centres than 
they had been before. For example, Cairenes and Alexandrians are now much closer 
in geographical terms to a foreign state and people than their forebears. In addition, 
the actual number of relations which are now classed as international because they 
are between states has increased significantly. There are also more markets than there 
had been in the imperial system and these are often separated from each other by 
governmental controls and barriers to trade and movement such as tariffs and taxes 
on goods, services and capital, as well as visa requirements. Even an initial comparison 
and assessment as highlighted above demonstrates that there are more actors in the 
regional system and therefore more sets of relations, even if we maintain a state-
centric approach (which ignores the range of non-state actors found in the region). 
But what does this all mean? Yes, there are more states in the regional system and yes 
there are as a result, more borders between the region’s people and non-state actors 
than there were at the start of the 20th century. However, we need to identify if and 
how this increase in state-actors and borders changed the relations between people 
within the region, as well as how this affected stability, market integration, economic 
activity and patterns of cooperation. At this point we need, initially, to refer back to 
the debate between analyses which place emphasis on the agency of individual actors 
and those which focus more on the structures of any given system. When viewing 
an individual actor as a rational and unitary actor which exists in time and space as 
distinct and separate from other actors the nature of that actor’s agency can be seen 
as the determining factor driving and shaping its interests, policies and actions.27 In 
this way, if Libya, for example, is examined as an actor which is distinct and separate 
from its immediate neighbours and other actors further a-field, focus can be placed on 
exploring processes which take place within its state borders. It is possible in this way 
to consider what the issues of significance are which effect only Libyans (such as access 
to fresh water sources – as Libya is not a riparian state on any shared river system or 
25  Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1991, pp. 282-285.
26  Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, 3rd edition, London, Penguin, 1992, p. 121.
27  See: James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994. (
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alternative source of fresh water), domestic pension schemes, access to education 
and so on. Furthermore, we can examine domestic processes of governance and 
decision-making as insular processes. It would then be possible to make conclusions 
about policy-making and actions which are specific to Libya. However, the success and 
validity of this type of analysis relies upon the assumption that Libya (as a state and 
people) does in fact exist as distinct and separate from other actors. The suggestion of 
this paper is that the people and states of the Middle East do not exist in this way, but 
instead demonstrate a high degree of historical integration (in the previous system, for 
example) and now constitute a regional system of states and people (even though this 
system is characterised quite heavily by the disintegration of international relations). 
As constituent parts of a system, therefore, the states in the region cannot be analysed 
as entirely distinct and separate.28 
In this way the value of an analysis which primarily considers the agency of these 
state-actors  is  undermined  because  we  cannot  guarantee  that  they  are  actually 
unitary and insulated. In other words, we cannot assume that Libya, to return to the 
above example, is able to rationally calculate what its own interests are based on what 
is relevant to its citizens in its own territory. Existing as part of a system implies at least 
some measure of interdependence,29 international interaction as well as systemic 
processes and issues which permeate and overlap state borders. This embedded set 
of structures, or what can be called the systemic environment,30 influences patterns of 
movement, trade, communication, access to and use of resources, security/insecurity, 
group  identity  and  levels  of  development,  therefore,  ultimately,  it  informs  state-
interests and the ability to act, or agency.31 
Engaging with an analysis of the systemic transformation which has occurred in the 
Middle East is no small endeavour. The sheer range of people, places, actors of various 
kinds and processes which need to be discussed is far too great for an analysis of this 
size. However, it is possible to explore some of the key themes found in an analysis 
of regional systemic transformation based on the theoretical assumptions outlined 
above. Furthermore, this can be achieved to some extent by using case studies to test 
the hypothesis which is posited in this paper. In one sense, it is possible to use a small 
number of case studies in order to develop the discussion of systemic transformation 
in this region. This is not to say that the use of a small number of case studies is 
sufficient to confirm the assumptions and hypothesis posited in this paper. Further 
studies which adopt this approach and the core research questions found within it 
must be conducted to develop the overall analysis.
It is important to note at this stage that the transformation from a system of empires 
to one of states most deeply affected the Ottoman Empire.32 The other major political 
entities found in the region in the 19th and early 20th centuries introduced above were 
28  Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East Studies”, pp. 11-31.
29  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 77, 
No 5, Sep/Oct 1998, pp. 81-94. 
30  Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, pp. 335-370.
31  Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Two Stories about Structure and Agency”, Review of International Studies, Vol 20, 
No 3, 1994, pp. 241-251.
32  Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace.(
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also deeply affected in terms of the creation of new or revised borders, alterations in 
the form of domestic governance structures and external relations. However, these 
actors remained less changed overall than did the Ottoman Empire (and what it meant 
for its citizens’ lives) which was completely removed as a political entity from the 
Middle East system. The vast majority of the new states and, therefore, new borders, 
governments, and claims to sovereignty occurred in the territories which had been the 
Ottoman Empire. Because of this fact the case study chosen here demonstrates the 
change in former Ottoman territories. 
Systemic Transformation
The  systemic  transformation  that  occurred  in  the  Middle  East  took  place  over  a 
relatively short period of time and was not characterised by drawn-out processes of 
evolving change. The processes were actually quite rapid and demonstrated a level of 
revolutionary change.33 Perhaps one of the most striking features of this transformation 
was that it often entailed very rapid changes and disruptions to structures already 
in place. Furthermore, these changes lead to deep-rooted alterations.34 The main 
thrust of this set of processes came during and immediately after World War One 
but significant periods of change can also be found in the 19th century and in the 
following two decades or so after World War One. We can take Republican France’s 
1798 invasion of Egypt as the real starting point of the systemic transformation of the 
Middle East. At the time Egypt was a Vilayet of the Ottoman Empire and had witnessed 
a significant amount of European economic penetration in the preceding fifty years.35 
Egypt had also begun to demonstrate slightly more autonomy under the Ottoman-
Egyptian Beys and Mamluk ruling class than was normal under the Ottoman system. 
As an aspiring general who had recently won highly-celebrated (in France) successes 
in the Italian and Austrian campaigns, Napoleon Bonaparte had set his sights on 
weakening France’s arch foe, the British Empire, by seizing control of Egypt and the 
key overland communication and trade route with the Indian sub-continent.36 In this 
way the conquest of the Middle East and the realignment of political entities within 
it were after-thoughts. As has been discussed in detail elsewhere, Napoleon’s military 
successes against the Ottoman-Egyptian military forces did not translate into overall 
success in the campaign and by 1801 the general himself had left Egypt and was back 
in France orchestrating his rise to power there and the remaining French forces were 
obliged to withdraw from Egypt altogether.37 By the end of this campaign the political 
map of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East as a whole had not actually changed 
permanently. However, this first modern encounter with European powers in the 
Middle East was a harbinger of more European conquest accompanied by the very 
real prospects for systemic change in the region. Indeed, the fact that the French were 
obliged to withdraw from Egypt was a result of the engagement of the British Royal 
33  James Renton, “Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-
1918”, Historical Journal, Vol 50, No 3, 2007, pp. 645-667.
34  Mehdi P. Amineh, “Introduction: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Study of the Greater Middle 
East2”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vol 6, No 1, 2007, pp. 13-15. 
35  Mansfield, The Arabs, p.121.
36  Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East, London, Palgrave, 2007. 
37  Piers Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt: The End of Napoleon’s Conquest, London, I.B. Tauris, 2010, pp. 225-233.(
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Navy and military forces alongside Ottoman-Egyptian forces (the near-constant state 
of rebellion in Egypt itself and the lack of total defeat of Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, 
the de facto rulers of Egypt before the invasion, also played a role38) is indicative of the 
inability of Middle East actors to preserve their own system by this time. 
The  1830  French  invasion  and  subsequent  annexation  of  the  Vilayet  of  Algiers 
represents the next stage in the downfall of the previous Middle East system. The 
Ottoman Vilayets of Tunis (1881) and Egypt (1882), as well as the Moroccan Kingdom (to 
varying degrees from the 1840s until formal recognition of French domination in 1904) 
were all occupied by either France or Britain through the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
In many ways these external interventions have one thing in common (and they vary in 
other ways): they represented intervention in the Middle East by external powers and 
a challenge to the existing regional system. In the case of Algeria, of course, the French 
did not seek to occupy and establish a puppet regime or subvert the existing regime 
to European interests. Instead, the French purpose in that part of the region was to 
possess it entirely as part of the French state. The Vilayet of Tunis and the Moroccan 
Kingdom are slightly different in that the general French aim and methods seemed to 
have been much closer to those witnessed in the Egyptian campaign of 1798-1801. 
The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 was ostensibly for economic purposes and to 
secure the Suez Canal and thus protect access to other parts of the world, notably the 
Asian possessions of the British Empire.39 It was, therefore, not entirely an intervention 
which sought to permanently alter the political and economic structures of that part 
of the regional system.
The main period of structural change that forms the core of the systemic transformation 
of the Middle East is undoubtedly found in the experiences of World War One. During 
this conflict the Ottoman Empire (which had already lost its North African Vilayets) 
chose to side with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire against the British, 
French and Tsarist Russia.40 There is no need for a repetition of the history of the war 
here, or even of a lengthy discussion of the events of the war in the Middle East. It 
is worth discussing the way the outcome of the war altered the Middle East system 
permanently though. As a result of the military and political successes of the Allied 
Powers the remaining territories of the Middle East which were not already controlled 
by  European  powers  were  almost  entirely  conquered.  The  only  exceptions  were 
Anatolia, the inner Arabian Peninsula and Iran. The rest of the region came under 
the influence of the British and French (either directly or implicitly, but for all intents 
and purposes, ruled by Britain or France). The political and economic structures of 
the region were, at that point, in the hands of these European powers and subject to 
further revision. Of course, a significant part of the Arab population in the Middle East 
had sought to achieve a grand state of their own based on ethno-linguistic identity41 
38  Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, pp. 167-172.
39  Roger Owen, “Egypt and Europe: From French Expedition to British Occupation”, in Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury 
and Mary C. Wilson, The Modern Middle East (2nd Edition), London, I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp: 119-123.
40  For a thorough discussion of this decision see: Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman 
Empire and the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
41  Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, “Reflections on Arab Nationalism”, Middle East Studies, Vol 32, No 4, 1996, pp. 367-
394.(
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and become separate from the Ottoman Empire and this desire was expressed in the 
Great Arab Revolt. The implication of this event was that systemic change was sought 
from within the region to some extent. But it was the whole-sale restructuring that 
the British and French introduced to the region which is of most significance here as 
indigenous processes of change were impeded or prevented by the European powers. 
The Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) which followed the end of World War One 
began the process of identifying and legitimising British and French aspirations in 
the Middle East. At the conference which produced this treaty both powers sought 
to reinforce their claims to various territories in the region.42 Mutual or overlapping 
claims were dealt with by a system of barter. The treaty itself identified and formalised 
a number of key elements pertaining to who would, in effect, possess which territories 
and thus have the ability to shape the political and economic structures found there. 
The British would possess the territories which would become contemporary Israel, 
Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait (along with the Middle East possessions already 
controlled by them). The French would possess the territories which would become 
contemporary Syria and Lebanon (in addition to the Middle East possessions already 
controlled by them). The Conference of San Remo (held from 19th to 26th of April 1922) 
finalised the division of the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence 
and legitimised the new League of Nations mandate system.43 Once again, literature44 
on the processes of negotiation which were taking place between the British and 
French during this period exists and this discussion does not need to be engaged with 
here. The result of these negotiations is worth attention though. The British were 
formally acknowledged as having (mandate) authority over the territories which would 
become Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and parts of Yemen. Meanwhile, the French were given mandate authority 
over what would become Morocco, Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon (Algeria was classed 
as a part of France and was not up for negotiation).45 Britain also was acknowledged 
to have significant interests in Iran but as Iran was never formally involved in World 
War One as a combatant and was never formally and fully occupied it maintained its 
nominal independence and was not part of the mandate system (what would become 
Libya remained under Italian control from 1911 until being relinquished to British and 
French authority in 1947). The effect of this treaty was the creation of new territorial 
entities, the proliferation of borders and the establishment of new governments with 
often competing claims to sovereignty. In short, the map of the region suddenly looked 
extremely different to the one that had existed in 1829 or even in 1914. It is important 
to remember at this point that the creation of new actors in the form of mandate 
territories and states (Turkey had emerged by 1923 as in independent and new state, 
as had Saudi Arabia by the early 1930s) represent significant changes in the political 
and economic structures of the Middle East from the perspective of the people who 
lived there at the time. 
42  Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp. 403-404.
43  Ibid.
44  See: Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1919-1931, London, Collins, 1972. 
45  Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 
6-8.(
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The impact in particular of the proliferation of borders and the extent of governmental 
authority expressed by the new indigenous governments over given territories in the 
region cannot be underestimated. It is not hard to imagine or to conclude that existing 
one day as an Ottoman citizen, for example, and then in a short period of time existing 
as a citizen of an entirely different political entity was quite disruptive to processes of 
movement, trade, association and identity. Existing under the confusing dual rule of 
a domestic government as well as a foreign occupying power must also have offered 
a great deal of dislocation and disruption to the lives and agency of the people of the 
region. The implementation of new rules, laws and procedures which accompanied 
existing ones, also are of concern for our discussion of the changes that took place 
in the region and their impacts on stability, economic activity and cooperation. The 
introduction of new currencies and subsequent alterations in monetary values also 
must be considered. Add to all of these changes the fact that people living in the region 
at this time did not know what final form the political entity they found themselves 
living in would take and how long their current situation would last and there is much 
to explore. 
The next stage in the transition to a modern state-system was the drive for independence 
from Britain and France which followed the Treaty of Sevres, the Conference of San 
Remo and the mandate system. The pursuit of full independence rapidly developed 
during and immediately after World War Two.46 This was partly as a result of the 
decline in the capabilities of Britain and France as they endured the attrition of the 
war, as well as the embedding of the new structures of the system which solidified the 
state as the main legitimate political unit in the region.47 While, for some years this 
process was characterised by broader notions of nationalism, such as pan-Arabism,48 
by  the  early  1990s  state-nationalisms  had  largely  replaced  region-wide  forms  of 
nationalism.49 The embedding of the state system is reflected in the primacy given 
to policies and programmes which represent state-interests as opposed to regional 
ones. The failure of pan-Arabism, for example, to hasten the reintegration of Middle 
East economic markets perhaps best demonstrates the transition to a state-system. 
There are some visible processes of integration taking place in the Middle East which 
represent the reintegration of the regional system. In other words, a move towards 
a regional system which while being made up of states will reflect similar patterns 
of interaction which can be identified in the previous system. However, it is doubtful 
that these processes represent a return to the previous system of a small number of 
large empires and emirates or sheikdoms. Instead, these processes can be seen to be 
synonymous with regionalisation and even globalisation and tend to be facilitated or 
hindered by state power. The contemporary world system which is characterised by 
46  Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, pp: 82-83.
47  Tareq Ishmael and Jacqueline Ishmael, Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and 
Change, London, Routledge, 2011, pp: 35-39.
48  See: Rashid Khalidi, The Origins of Arab Nationalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1991; Mahmoud 
Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 26, No 2, 
1994, pp: 201-222; Juan Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti, “Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and 
Central Asia: introduction”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 34, No 1, 2002, pp: 189-203
49  See: Elie Podeh, The Decline of Arab Unity: The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic, Eastbourne, Sussex 
Academic Press, 1999. (
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processes of integration in practically all spheres of human agency50 may simply be 
reflected in the processes which are taking place in the Middle East. The Greater Arab 
Free Trade Area (GAFTA) agreement is one example of these processes. It is facilitated 
by states through the League of Arab States’ council of Arab economic unity but its 
implementation in 2005 has been mixed as state governments have differed in their 
adherence to the institutions of this agreement.51 
Ottoman Vilayets and Modern States
At the onset of World War One the Ottoman Empire (in the Middle East) was organised 
in much the same way as it had been in the preceding centuries. Vilayets (provinces) 
were the primary unit of political and economic organisation under the umbrella of 
the imperial state.52 Between Anatolia and the northern Hejaz (today’s western Saudi 
Arabia) was the Vilayets of Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo in Syria. These Vilayets were 
made up of the lands and communities which today form the states of Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Israel and Palestine. The contemporary relations of these communities are 
influenced by a different set of political and economic structures compared to those 
that existed in the early 1900s Vilayet. In particular the proliferation of mandate 
borders (or what one could term hard borders) as opposed to the internal district 
borders (soft borders) of the Vilayet system meant that there was a greater level of 
governmental regulation of the movement of people, goods, services, capital and 
institutions within this territory following the creation of the mandate system.53 Where 
it was possible to identify a market which was highly integrated, both with itself (the 
Vilayet) and the Ottoman Empire as a whole, this proliferation of borders led to a 
disintegrated market which resulted in the creation of several smaller markets; each 
quite detached from the other for much of the 20th century and which remain less 
integrated at present than they had been under the Ottoman system in relative terms. 
In other words the modern states which emerged out of the Vilayets in Syria as a result 
of British and French control became insulated markets and communities which were 
separated from each other by state borders and different political-economic national/
state systems. 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries the rural and urban communities  of the 
Vilayets of Syria were economically interdependent. There existed explicit divisions of 
labour which had allowed this part of the Ottoman Empire to function economically. 
The relationship between Nablus and Salt offers a good case to explore. As medium 
size settlements in this period, Nablus (approximately 70000) and Salt (approximately 
2000054) were able to develop certain comparative advantages (to use David Ricardo’s 
term55) and a trading relationship which underpinned their local economies. By the 
50  Jan Arte Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2nd Edition), London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp: 15-
29.
51  Bernard Hoekman and Jamel Zarrouk, Catching Up With the Competition: Trade Opportunities and Challenges for 
Arab Countries, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 290.
52  Suraiya Faroqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert and Sevket Pamuk, An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire, (vol. 2), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
53  Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp: 435-448.
54  Peter Hinchcliffe and Beverley Milton-Edwards, Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy, London, Routledge, 2001, p: 22. 
55  David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, New York, Prometheus Books, 1996.(
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late 19th century the economy of Nablus had developed quite successfully as a centre 
for manufacturing textiles and clothing as well as agricultural products and merchants 
from the city sought to expand their market access east of the River Jordan. At the 
time Salt was the only significant settlement in the territory which would become 
Jordan (but still was only a small and relatively poor village56) and so became a focus 
for Nabulsi merchants. As a result of the development of this trading relationship 
Salt’s economy developed quite rapidly as a source of raw materials (especially wood 
and other construction materials) and agricultural produce (due to its highly fertile 
soils). The coupling of the economies of Salt and Nablus allowed these two towns to 
prosper into the 1920s but their interdependence would prove also to be the cause 
of their stagnation following the withdrawal of the British from the region in the late 
1940s. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 which followed the British withdrawal from 
the mandate of Palestine and the newly independent state of Transjordan (later to 
become Jordan) resulted in significant disruptions to both Nablus and Salt. In the case 
of the former its integration with the community in Haifa was lost as this town became 
part of the state of Israel. The relationship between Haifa and Nablus emerged for 
economic reasons in much the same way as that between Nablus and Salt. Haifa acted 
as not only a market for the exchange of goods and services but also an entry and exit 
point to the Mediterranean Sea and thus acted as a major trade centre. The loss of this 
access to the Mediterranean Sea left Nablus with a significantly damaged economy. By 
extension Haifa also acted as a trade outlet for Salt’s economy and so the impact was 
much the same on that town. 
As the economies of Nablus and Salt both began to suffer some level of stagnation and 
decline as a result of the loss of the Haifa market and access to the Mediterranean 
Sea trade between them also suffered. Nevertheless, as a result of the Jordanian 
annexation of the West Bank after the 1948-49 war Nablus and Salt remained as parts 
of the same political and economic entity and therefore enjoyed unhindered access to 
each other’s markets.57 The 1967 Six Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
would change this as Israel conquered and occupied the West Bank from Jordan. This 
severed the relationship between Nablus and Salt by creating a border between the 
two towns which would remain closed for significant amounts of time afterwards or 
which was subject to considerable regulation and periodic closures.58 Furthermore, 
following the decision by King Hussein of Jordan in 1988 to recognise the legal and 
administrative separation of the West Bank and Jordan the border between the two 
territories, and thus Nablus and Salt, was reinforced59 – there was in effect a border 
between the states of Jordan and Palestine as well as a de facto border between Jordan 
and Israel as a third state (over a territory which was occupied). The economic impacts 
of this separation of the markets in Nablus and Salt was quite damaging to both. 
The movement of people between the towns was significantly disrupted or halted 
altogether at various times since, as was the movement of goods, services and capital. 
56  Hinchcliffe and Milton-Edwards, Jordan, p: 22.
57  Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006 pp: 120-143. 
58  Avi Schlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, London, Penguin, 2000, pp: 510-514.
59  Philip Robins, “Shedding Half a Kingdom: Jordan’s Dismantling of Ties with the West Bank”, Bulletin (British Soci-
ety for Middle East Studies), Vol 16, No 5, 1989, pp: 162-175.(
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This represented a disintegration of the two markets and the two communities who 
have lived ever since as part of separate political entities and national/state markets.
Conclusions
This  paper  set  out  to  explore  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  systemic 
transformation which occurred in the Middle East through the 19th and 20th centuries 
lead to the disintegration of relations between peoples in the region. In order to 
engage with this discussion a number of theoretical assumptions and arguments were 
posited. To some extent these developed out of the existing structure-agency debate 
in IR but also, in some ways, they are specific to the Middle East and its recent history. 
In the first case, this paper takes the position that the influence of structures on actors 
in the Middle East system significantly impacts upon agency to the extent that it 
helps to determine how actors behave. In the second case, this paper has argued that 
significant changes did take place in the Middle East in the ways in which the people of 
the region were organised into groups, were governed and therefore how they related 
to each other. These changes manifested as a result of the external intervention of 
Britain and France which began in 1798 and picked up pace in the mid- to late-1800s, 
and which culminated with the victory of the Allied Powers in World War One, the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the League of Nations 
mandate system. The final argument posited here is that the creation of the new states 
by the mandate system as well as the emergence of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran as 
modern states (and not empires) lead to a proliferation of hard borders, boundaries 
and claims to sovereignty within the region and that these new borders disrupted 
economic, social and political relations within the region. This is in contrast to the 
structures which existed in the previous regional system, which was characterised by 
fewer borders and boundaries between people. 
The motivation for this analysis largely stems from a concern with the patterns of 
interaction between people in the region before and after systemic transformation 
took  place.  The  key  questions  here  relate  to  the  movement  of  people,  goods, 
capital, resources and ideas, as well as relating to identity and by extension levels of 
interaction and cooperation between the people of the region. This study has adopted 
the notion that an integrated system is likely to be far more stable and will witness 
more cooperation and less conflict than one which is disintegrated. It is also likely to 
be more economically dynamic. It was necessary to develop this analysis by exploring 
case study evidence to analyse whether patterns of interaction under the previous 
regional system were likely to be more intense and integrated than after the state-
system emerged. The study of the territories which comprised the Ottoman Vilayet of 
Syria was useful in this regard as much of the alterations and additions of new actors 
in the region took place in the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. 
With regards to the research questions considered here, a number of conclusions can 
be drawn. The movement of people, goods, services, capital and ideas in the Ottoman 
Vilayet of Syria was facilitated by an integrated market and no hard borders. Indeed, 
the possibility for integration between peoples/markets was, in relative terms, much 
greater than that which exists in the modern state-system between Israel, Jordan, (
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Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. The advent of the state-system in the former Vilayets 
in  Syria  has  largely  been  characterised  by  significant  disruption  of  economic  and 
social interdependence and interaction. What once existed as one market and social 
environment has fragmented into separate markets and states. The final conclusion 
drawn from this study relies rather more on theoretical interpretation than empirical 
observations and suggests that economic integration, and therefore the stability of 
this region’s international relations, have been challenged by the processes of systemic 
transformation. (
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